Foreign fees and customers'cash withdrawals by Magnac, Thierry
Foreign fees and customerscash withdrawals
Thierry Magnac, Toulouse School of Economics
March 6, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of foreign fees, paid by consumers when they
withdraw cash at banks that are not their own, on their withdrawals. We take advantage
of a natural experiment whereby (non linear) payment fees for withdrawing cash at foreign
ATMs were introduced at one point in time. We also use this experiment to evaluate the
substitutions between foreign withdrawals and various other means of payment such as own
bank or desk withdrawals, payments by card or cheque. Using panel data on accounts at one
specic bank, we rst estimate reduced form treatment e¤ect models before carrying on with
the estimation of a structural model. The latter allows us to compute the counterfactual
impacts of changing the non linear schedule of foreign fees. Impacts are sizeable and in
particular on bank prots.
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JEL codes: C21, D12, G21
1
1 Introduction1
Transactions are costly and these costs di¤er across means of payments and across agents. Bank
customers use their deposit accounts to pay daily or weekly expenses in cash, cheques, payment
cards or transfers. Each of those means of payments generate specic costs for those customers,
shops and banks (i.e. xed costs of card use, interchange fees etc). For instance, the costs of
cash payments for customers arise from losses of interest payments on deposit accounts or risks of
theft but also from withdrawing cash at ATMs. Even if banks installed ATMs in most countries
because the withdrawal cost was much lower at ATMs than at the bank desks, they did that within
bank networks (for instance, Hannan, Kiser, Prager and McAndrews, 2003 in which the earlier
literature is also reviewed). In those networks, cash can be withdrawn not only from customers
own bank ATMs but also from foreign bank ATMs. Yet, foreign cash withdrawals by customers
is signicantly more costly for banks since they are charged interchange fees. This is why in most
countries banks owning ATM charge foreign fees, and even surchages in countries like the United
States (since 1996) or the Netherlands. Both fees and surcharges are typically of the order of 1$
or 1.50$ (for instance, Knittel & Stango, 2009). Moreover, there could also be positive incentives
through loyalty programs (Humphreys, 2010).
Customers are negatively a¤ected by foreign fees and surcharging if all other things remain
the same and in particular the number of ATMs. The main tradeo¤ for customers for using
home or foreign ATMs is between distance and fees so that ATM density matters and overall
the cost is much lower in urban areas. Nonetheless, banks get prots out of foreign fees and
surcharges (keeping prices of deposit accounts constant) so that increases in fees tend to make
them deploy more ATMs. This favors customers. In total, e¤ects can be negative or positive.
A small empirical and theoretical litterature has developed on these premises (Hannan et al.,
2003, Knittel and Stango, 2009, or Donze and Dubec, 2011). Empirical evidence points out that
consumers are likely to gain more in urban areas (Gowrisankaran & Krainer, 2011).
A key parameter in these evaluations is the elasticity of foreign withdrawals with respect to
1This paper results from a collaboration with a European bank whose proprietary and condential data were
used for this analysis. The agreement that was signed explains why some characteristics of the experiment like its
exact timing are "anonymized" in this paper. This is also true for names of collaborators and research assistants
at this bank whose help is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
2
foreign fees since it describes how consumers substitute away from cash withdrawals at other
banksATMs. This is what we do rst in this paper by estimating this elasticity using microdata
on bank accounts. Parameters of derived interest are the substitution elasticities between foreign
withdrawals and other means of payments like cash withdrawals at home ATMs or at the bank
desk, card payments or cheques. We can also look at the way amounts which are withdrawn or
paid for all means of payments are a¤ected by the change in foreign fees. In other words, the main
contribution of this paper is to estimate the treatment impact of foreign fees on foreign ATM
withdrawals and other means of payment at both extensive and intensive margins.
The large sample of accounts that we follow over a 28 month period in the last ten years is
drawn from the population of accounts managed by a large deposit bank operating in Europe.
The "treatment" consisted in the introduction of a fee, p0; for each foreign cash withdrawal out
of a deposit account, beyond an allowance of a positive threshold, n0; of foreign withdrawals per
month. This natural experiment occurred at around the mid period in our sample. The data are
original since most of the data used until now to our knowledge consist in bank level information
or household surveys. In particular, Kalckreuth, Schmidt and Stix (2014) nd a signicant but
small e¤ect of fees using German household data. Our empirical strategy have drawbacks however
since condentiality of what can be publicly released is required.2
The rst reduced form method that is used consists in contrasting the behaviour of those
customers who are not (or very mildly) impacted by the new piecewise linear price schedule for
instance those who usually withdraw cash at a foreign ATM a number of times per month less
than the threshold n0 and the customers who are impacted withdrawing more than n0 times
per month at a foreign ATM. We use pretreatment information to dene what a "usual" foreign
withdrawal behavior means. The second more structural method allows to go further and compute
the impacts of hypothetical scenarios such as a modication in the fee p0 and the threshold n0.
The main results are the following. Foreign withdrawals of intensive users decrease by around
25 or 30% because of the increase in the foreign fee. Those withdrawals are not compensated by
additional home ATMs or desk withdrawals although the amount withdrawn moderately increases.
The counterfactual analysis allows to show that doubling the fee would have increased expected
2For instance,it was requested that p0 and n0 should not be revealed lest the bank be identied. We give indices
about their magnitudes below.
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prots by 85% and to show that decreasing the threshold by one (respectively two) unit, would
have increased prots by 40% (resp. 140%) with respect to the original experiment.
We present the data and the reduced form evaluation in Section 2 and then turn to the
structural model in Section 3. Results of the structural estimation as well as counterfactual
scenarii are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and treatment evaluation
The treatment schedule is the following. We denote t = 1; :; 28 the monthly index and distinguish
5 periods because of the specic structure of the natural experiment.
 Pretreatment period : t = 1; :; 13 : Foreign fees are equal to zero.
 First interim period : t = 14; :; 17 : It is announced during month t = 14 (with media
coverage) that foreign fees would be set to p0 (slightly above half of the value charged by
the competitors in the market) for any foreign ATM withdrawal beyond n0 per month (one
unit above the largest value used in the market) and that this would be starting in month
t = 18. In month t = 16; customers were informed by mail.
 Second interim period : t = 18; :; 20 : It is announced at period t = 17 that foreign fees would
remain set at zero until month t = 21.
 First treatment period : t = 21; 22 : Foreign fees are increased to the announced p0 beyond
n0 foreign ATM withdrawals per month in month t = 21 and fees are charged in the invoice
sent at month t = 22.
 Second treatment period : t = 23; :; 28 : Foreign fees remain at level p0 beyond n0 foreign
ATM withdrawals per month for the whole period without any announcement of future
changes.
This timing is slightly unusual since there could be announcement e¤ects whereby consumers
would adapt their behavior prior to the exact date of implementation. Customers could also be
confused because the implementation date was postponed and might act in the second interim
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period as if the reform would actually be implemented. This is why we dene two interim peri-
ods in which (1) the announcement was made (2) the exact date of implementation might have
been confusing for consumers and we analyse the possible impact on behavior at these periods.
Conversely, other customers could have also been surprised by the implementation of the reform
and this is why we distinguish two treatment periods in order to let them, or a fraction of them,
adapt to the new set of prices.
2.1 Data
The main working sample consists of 60,000 individual accounts from which there has been at least
one foreign withdrawal during the period t = 1 to 12. Variables include the number and amount
of foreign ATM withdrawals, own ATM withdrawals, debit card payments, bank desk withdrawals
& cheque payments. We also have access to another sample of 60,000 accounts from which 6
foreign withdrawals have been carried out during at least one month during the period t = 1 to
12. The second sample includes more treated accounts at the cost of losing the interpretation of
our parameters as parameters concerning the general population of reference. It will mainly be
used as a check on our results using our main working sample.
Summary statistics for variables are described in Table 1. The average number of withdrawals
from an ATM per month is 3.42, 45% of which are from an ATM at a foreign bank (1.58). Yet,
average amounts withdrawn at foreign ATMs are lower and comprise roughly one third of all ATM
withdrawals. Indeed, amounts withdrawn at the bank desk are on par with foreign withdrawals
while the latter is six times lower in terms of numbers. It thus seems that ATM foreign withdrawals
are used for small withdrawals responding to immediate needs and might not be as planned as
home ATM withdrawals. The number of card payments is much higher (11.43 on average) and
the amounts paid by cards or cheques are comparable (around 430 euros per month).3
Raw frequencies of the number of cash withdrawals at foreign ATMs over the full time span
are given in Table 2. We distinguish across columns the Pretreatment, Interim and Treatment
periods as dened above. We also distinguish observations grouped by the number of foreign
withdrawals per month in which the main cuto¤ is the threshold n0 beyond which each additional
foreign withdrawal pays the fee p0. We also use ner groupings as shown in the Table. In the
3This bank proposes only debit cards as credit cards in the US sense are not very much used in this market.
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pretreatment period, 7.2% of accounts per month were withdrawing stricly more than n0 units
at foreign ATMs. In the nal treatment period, this goes down to 5.4% which indicates a quite
strong treatment e¤ect. This raw e¤ect is almost zero in the two Interim periods (respectively
6.8% and 7.4%) and not very large in the rst Treatment period (6.6%). Rather unexpectedly,
the number of accounts making no foreign withdrawals increase from the Pretreatment period
(44.8%) to the full Treatment period (50.9%) which might indicate that some consumers adapt
their behavior in a more extensive than intensive way. Note that if this was the case, it would
lead to underestimate the treatment e¤ects and would make our further results conservative.
At this aggregate level though, we cannot distinguish macro shocks from treatment e¤ects
and our further analysis aims at precisely doing this. The aggregate behavior of foreign ATM
cash withdrawals seems to have changed over this period and the market level number of cash
withdrawals is going upward. Aggregate numbers might also be misleading since a fraction of
customers those who withdraw cash from a foreign ATM relatively little  is not likely to be
harmed by the reform. In addition, there are a few exemptions from paying the fee for holders of
the best quality cards. It is thus dubious that the treament e¤ect on the treated is identiable at
the aggregate level.
2.2 Empirical strategy
2.2.1 Construction of control and treatment groups
The principle followed in the empirical strategy is to contrast the behaviour of customers accord-
ing to their revealed preferences before the reform. For this, we adopt the framework of policy
evaluations distinguishing treated and control accounts in the population. Broadly speaking:
 accounts in the treated group are the ones from which cash from a foreign ATM strictly is
withdrawn more than n0 times per month,
 accounts in the control group are the ones from which cash is withdrawn from foreign ATMs
less than n0 times per month or have a specic card exempting them from paying fees.
This construction cannot be exact though, since consumers adapt their behavior in the treat-
ment period and this is why we use the outcome in the pretreatment period i.e. the number of
foreign ATM withdrawals from the account between t = 1 and t = 9 to construct what we call the
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intensity of use. A full blown structural strategy based on an economic model is presented and
estimated in the following Section and denes the intensity of use in a less ad-hoc way.
Specically, preferences are assumed to be stable over time (allowing still for aggregate e¤ects)
and we use the mean of foreign ATM withdrawals from each account between t = 1 and t = 9
as a measure of the intensity of use of foreign ATM cash withdrawals. We denote this variable
y
(0)
i . We thus build our empirical strategy on the presumption that if this variable is close to zero
the impact of the reform is zero while if this variable is signicantly above n0 the reform has a
full impact. We test below that results are insensitive if we replace the mean by the median or
the third quartile of foreign ATM cash withdrawals in the pretreatment period. We also tested
that results are insensitive to the number of periods we use to construct these variables in the
pretreatment period (e.g. between t = 1 and t = 6 or t = 12).
2.2.2 Treatment e¤ect parameters
To carry out this empirical strategy, denote yit the number of foreign withdrawals during month
t for account i and specify that:
yit = t + y
(0)
i +
4X
P=1
Py
(0)
i  fTreatment period = Pg + "it; if t > 9; (1)
in which t are monthly dummies and P are our parameters of interest that are the average
relative treatment e¤ects on the treated. They are equal to the relative reduction of average
foreign withdrawals for the treated since the treatment time dummies are interacted with the
intensity of use y(0)i . The coe¢ cients of treatment dummies, P ; therefore contrast outcomes
before and after treatment and between groups dened by the intensity of use. In this sense, it
is a di¤erence in di¤erence parameter (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2011). Note also that we used
only periods after t = 10 since pretreatment y(0)i is constructed using information between t = 1
and 9. We also checked that using xed e¤ect methods instead of controling for the variable y(0)i
in levels, does not change results.
There are four treatment dummies (P = 1; :; 4) corresponding to the two Interim periods and
the two Treatment periods. There are additional twists. In particular, there exist premium cards
which dispense cardholders with paying foreign fees. We take this into account in the estimation
by imposing that those accounts belong to the control group.4 We also use additional controls
4It could well be that the decision of holding those cards depend on the intensity of use of foreign withdrawals.
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describing month characteristics, such as the number of business days, interacted with yi0 to
disentangle specic characteristics of the month from treatment e¤fects.
2.2.3 Substitution e¤ects
As we observe other outcomes related to those accounts, we can take advantage of the introduction
of this fee on foreign ATM withdrawals to measure substitution e¤ects between means of payments
either in terms of numbers or amounts paid. Let wit such a variable describing, say, the number
of payments by card during the month or the amount withdrawn from a home ATM during the
month. We write the following xed e¤ect regression:
wit = yit + ui + it;
in which yit is the number of foreign withdrawals and usual assumptions about the error terms
are made. The right-hand side term, yit; however, is endogenous and we instrument it by using
equation (1) above in which the intensity of use, yi0; is interacted with treatment period dummies.
We thus use the exogenous variation in foreign ATM cash withdrawals triggered by the increase
in fees to infer estimates of substitution e¤ects between foreign withdrawals and other means of
payment or amounts paid.
2.3 Results
Table 3 presents the main results of the estimation of the reduced form. In the rst two columns,
the variable summarizing the intensity of use between t = 1 and 9 is taken to be the mean while
in the third and fourth columns, the median and the third quartile are used. The rst column
reports OLS estimates while in the second column, arbitrary serial correlation is allowed and
Feasible GLS estimates are reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the level of
the account (Cameron and Miller, 2012). Overall, these various estimation procedures show that
results are qualitatively robust. The most noticeable e¤ect of these variations in methods is that
treatment e¤ect estimates tend to be slightly smaller when the third quartile is used as a proxy
for the intensity of use.
Nonetheless, the cost of those cards is substantially higher than the level of these fees since they o¤er other services
than complimentary foreign fees.
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The medium-run treatment e¤ect estimate is negative as expected, lies between 18.5 and 24.8%
and is very signicant. It means that the number of withdrawals at foreign ATMs decreases by
around 20% for the treated after period t = 23. The short-run treatment e¤ect is slightly lower
(around 15%) in the rst two months of implementation of the program (t = 21=22). More
surprisingly, there are also e¤ects of the treatment in anticipation of the program. In the periods
t = 14=18 in which the treatment was announced, the number of foreign withdrawals decreases by
around 5% while in the months in which there was a possible confusion about the exact date of
implementation the e¤ect is around 7%. All those results are signicant at levels well below 1%.
Ending with controls, we used month characteristics such as the number of business days or
whether the month begins or ends a day between Monday and Thursday. Namely, withdrawals
and other banking operations impact the account with a delay of one or two business days and
this is why, for instance, months ending a Friday or a weekend might see fewer operations than a
month ending an earlier weekday. This is conrmed by results presented in Table 3.
Results are also robust to other changes of specication and samples. In Table 4, Column 1,
we report OLS estimates when the summary for the intensity of use is constructed from t = 1
to 12 and the sample used is between t = 13 to 28: In column 2, we use the alternative sample
in which the number of foreign withdrawals by account is much larger. Results described above
are marginally a¤ected by these sizeable changes. The permanent treatment e¤ect on the treated
estimate stays put at around 25%.
Table 5 presents the estimates of substitution e¤ects between the number of banking operations
which are realized within a month. We only report the estimated coe¢ cient of the impact of the
number of foreign withdrawals on the number of operations although the same controls than in
the analyses before are also used as covariates in those regressions.
We used three estimation methods whose results are reported in rows: the rst one is a standard
xed e¤ect estimation which should be biased if the number of foreign withdrawals is not weakly
exogenous. Unobserved shocks that a¤ect foreign withdrawals might a¤ect at the same time the
shocks acting on other banking operations. This is indeed what we nd by contrasting xed e¤ect
results with those obtained by using instrumental variables (IVs) with xed e¤ect in which IVs
are the 4 pretreatment and treatment periods interacted with the summary of the intensity of
use. There are strong di¤erences between estimates across the rst two rows and Hausman tests
9
reject the assumption of exogeneity (except for the number of cheques for which the substitution
e¤ect is at the margin of signicance). We also contrast these IV estimates shown in the second
row of Table 5 with estimates using a more restricted set of IVs and xed e¤ects, reported in the
third row. The only excluded variable from the outcome equation left is the permanent treatment
period (t = 23=28) interacted with the summary of the intensity of use and this model is just
identied. There are no signicant di¤erences with the second row estimates and additional IVs
are thus valid instruments.
In terms of economic e¤ects, the number of foreign ATM withdrawals seems to be a substitute
to the number of ATM withdrawals in customershome bank although the e¤ect is very small
(around 0.03). Other behavior like the number of desk withdrawals and cheques are insignicantly
or marginally impacted by the number of foreign withdrawals. More intriguingly, the fewer foreign
withdrawals are, the fewer card payments are made. A decrement of one unit in foreign ATM
withdrawals decreases the number of card payments by 0.5. This seems to be at variance with
what is observed in household surveys as reported by Kalckreuth et al. (2014). It might be that
the announcement of a fee on foreign withdrawals might have triggered the false anticipation by
customers that card payments would also be taxed. There is some evidence of it in the data in
which the response of card payments in the rst period of treatment (t = 21=22) is stronger than in
the second treatment period (t = 23=28). Yet, the decrease in card payments in the latter period
(t = 23=28) is impacted negatively in a signicant way. This could mean that some customers
give up using the card for both uses, foreign withdrawals and card payments, and for instance
leave their card at home. This is conrmed by the results in the next Table.
Table 6 indeed reports the e¤ect of the number of foreign withdrawals on the amounts concerned
by the various banking operations. More importantly, it shows that the amounts withdrawn at
foreign ATMs increase signicantly when the number of such withdrawals decreases. Customers
rationally expect that those withdrawals are more expensive and decreases the marginal cost of
withdrawing by adapting amounts. Some withdrawals are also reported on home withdrawals
whose number increases (see Table 5) and whose amount decreases. Amounts paid by payment
cards increase as well, conrming that foreign withdrawals and card payments are complements.
Finally, from results of Table 3, we can compute expected prots that the bank gained by
implementing this treatment. If we do not allow for any behavioral response to the fee imposed
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on foreign withdrawals the expected prot per month and per account is between 0.12e and
0.20e depending on the month. Allowing for behavioral response, expected prot per month and
per account is thus estimated to be between 0.09e and 0.15e. To this prot, should be added
the savings in terms of interchange fees which are roughly equal to the behavioural e¤ects since
the interchange fee is of the same order of magnitude than the fee that was implemented. The
implementation of this fee is thus seen to have a signicant impact on prots and the behavioral
response of customers to avoid paying these fees is signicant. Incentivizing customers to refrain
from foreign withdrawals has thus a signicant impact on bank prots.
3 Structural model
Previous results concern the observed impact of the increase in foreign ATM fees as they appear
in the data. Those results cannot be used however as a guide for formulating the best policy of the
bank. In contrast, constructing a structural model allows us to assess the impact of hypothetical
scenarios on foreign withdrawals in which the fee p0 would be increased or the threshold n0
changed. In this sense, the structural analysis allows to extrapolate the natural experimental data
that we observe to estimate the e¤ects of counterfactual experiments. This is obtained by setting
up assumptions on the economic structure that we now detail.
3.1 Uniform prices
We start by constructing the baseline scenario under which fees are zero since this represents the
pretreatment period behaviour. As before, let the number of foreign ATM withdrawals be yit.
Utility is assumed to be given by:
u(yit) = yit   (yit)
2
2it
:
In this specication, it
2
is the bliss point and is always what is preferred by the consumer when
foreign withdrawals are free. It is the result of a cost and benet analysis of cash withdrawing
by customers as detailed for instance by Alvarez and Lippi (2009) in an admittedly more general
continuous time framework. We do not exclude regions in which marginal utility is decreasing since
they are never chosen at the optimum. Note that we neglect the discreteness of the dependent
variable yit for simplicity.
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If withdrawals are priced at a uniform price pit, marginal utility is equal to the price pit
multiplied by the marginal utility of money it:
u0(yit) = itpit =) (1  yit
it
) = itpit
which yields a linear demand function:
yit = it   pitit;
in which it = itit. Nonetheless, the current experiment implements a two-part schedule in
which withdrawals are costly if they are above a threshold only. This makes demand non linear
in this simple model.
3.2 Piecewise linear pricing
Let now assume that the price is set to p0, only when yit > n0 so that:
pit = p0(yit   n0)1fyit > n0g:
There are two solutions:8<: yit = it if it  n0;yit = it   itp0(yit   n0)1fyit > n0g if it > n0:
Indeed, the second regime can also be rewritten:
(1 + itp01fyit > n0g)(yit   n0) = it   n0
which validates that 1fyit > n0g = 1fit > n0g: Replacing and recomposing, we have:
yit = it   (it   n0)
itp0
1 + itp0
1fit > n0g: (2)
This result allows to contrast the pretreatment behavior and the behavior under treatment. In
the pretreatment period, demand is equal to it and this depends only on the needs for cash by
customers as well as on their costs of going to the nearest ATM. Introducing a piecewise linear
pricing schedule as was done at period t = 21 in our data has now an e¤ect which is equal to
(it   n0)1fit > n0g
itp0
1 + itp0
= (it   n0)1fit > n0git; (3)
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and this is the structural e¤ect that we want to estimate. We specify in the next subsection the
term it as a function of parameters whose estimation leads to estimates of it and of counterfactual
treatment e¤ects in which p0 and n0 are varied. Note also that equation (2) allows to focus on
price e¤ects while non price e¤ects such as the announcement of the increase of fees are now
captured by shocks on the redened intensity of use, it.
3.3 Specication
Write rst the unobserved propensity to withdraw at foreign ATMs as:
it =  t + i(1 + g(t; )) + "it
in which  t are time dummies, g(t; ) a function of month characteristics and i is an individual
e¤ect. We set:
g(t; ) = zt (4)
in which zt are characteristics of the month (number of business days, the month ends between
Monday and Thursday etc). This specication retains some non stationary aggregate components
 t that can accomodate the actual aggregate increase in withdrawals over this period and a per-
manent intensity of use, i, as in the reduced form model. This permanent e¤ect is also interacted
with the characteristics of the month since the number of business days for instance is assumed
to a¤ect multiplicatively the resulting number of withdrawals. Variables zt can also include the
indicators of the periods after the announcement of the introduction of the fee in order to capture
the informational impact of such an announcement. It thus takes into account that tastes can
permanently change when such a fee is announced as was suggested by the reduced form estimates
even in the absence of any price change.
For simplicity, we also posit that
"it  N(0; 2t ):
Turning to the term describing the treatment e¤ect, we need to specify the additional term that
appears in equation (3) and we write that:5
it = d0t + d1(it   n0); (5)
5The data would be su¢ ciently rich to allow for a more semi-parametric and non linear functional form than
this one although we keep this for future work.
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The treatment e¤ect is made dependent on time through d0t to allow for learning for instance as
in the reduced form section. We also specify that the treatment e¤ect depends on the level of the
individual intensity of use, it to allow for non linear e¤ects. The impact of the treatment for
heavy users of foreign withdrawals might di¤er from the impact for light users.
Given these specications, the estimation of equation (2) requires to solve two methodological
issues. We rst rewrite equation (2) as an estimating function of the variables observed in the
data since the treatment e¤ect in equation (3) is random and should thus be integrated out and be
written as a function of observables only. This task is performed in Appendix A.1. Second, we use
an iterative algorithm to estimate the parameters of this estimating equation and this algorithm
is presented in Appendix A.2. If this algorithm converges (and it always converged in models we
estimated), it necessarily points to a solution of the estimating equation. The uniqueness of such
a solution follows from using arguments about the quasi-bilinearity of the estimating equation
(Blundell and Robin, 1999). Standard errors are also easily constructed by bootstrapping results
and paying attention to the clustering of the data at the level of accounts.
3.4 Counterfactuals
For the hypothetical scenarios described below, we present various summaries of demand, prot
and costs. We report these summaries obtained by recomputing demand for each account in the
sample over the whole period t = 1 to 28 using the new parameters in terms of fee and threshold.
The way we perform those experiments are described in Appendix A.3 in which it is explained
how we construct for each i a sequence of reconstructed intensity of use or bliss points, ^it.
We estimate the counterfactual impacts under several scenarii. First, we contrast several
summaries of demand and prots in the (partly) counterfactual situation in which no foreign
fees (p0 = 0) would have been imposed with the summaries obtained when the fee p0 and the
threshold n0 take their actual values in the treatment during the whole period. This allows to
evaluate roughly the goodness of t of the model. This is not far from what is observed in the
data although this information is partly counterfactual since no account can be treated and non
treated at the same time.
We also use two scenarii under which the fee is increased by 50% or by 100%, the threshold
remaining xed at n0. We use the following method. Recall that the deep parameter it in equation
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(2) is given by:
itp0
1 + itp0
= d0t + d1(it   n0);
If this quantity is between 0 and 1 this is the case for all accounts in our estimation we get:
it =
1
p0
d0t + d1(it   n0)
1  d0t   d1(it   n0)
:
This allows to compute the counterfactual treatment e¤ect for a fee p1 because the treatment
parameter becomes:
itp1
1 + itp1
=
(d0 + d1(it   n0))p1p0
1 + (p1
p0
  1)(d0 + d1(it   n0))
:
Demand is thus obtained by equation (2) as:
yit = it   (it   n0)1fit > n0g
itp1
1 + itp1
in which unknown parameters are replaced by their estimates in the structural model.
In the last two hypothetical scenarii, we change the threshold of the piece-wise linear schedule
by decrementing the threshold by either one unit or two units and keeping the fee at its original
level. By setting the threshold to k, we now have the counterfactual equation:
yit = it   (it   k)1fit > kg
itp0
1 + itp0
= it   (it   k)1fit > kg(d0t + d1(it   n0));
that is estimated easily using structural estimates. We then compute summaries of counterfactual
demands and prots.
4 Results
Table 7 reports estimates of the parameters of the structural model using two specications. As
shown in equations (4) et (5), there are two types of parameters, the parameters interacted with
the individual mean intensity of use i and the parameters related to the treatment, d0 and d1.
The two specications di¤er in the number of interactive parameters: one of them interacts the
intensity of use with a trend (Time) and the indicators of the periods after t = 14 at which the
announcement of the treatment was made. In contrast with what we obtained in the reduced
form estimation those parameters are not signicant. Announcements of the treatment do not
seem to have signicant e¤ects when a complete structural model is estimated. This is why we
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also report results without including those interactions. In contrast, other characteristics of the
month like the number of business days and whether the month starts or ends a week day before
Friday are signicant. Their magnitudes are less signicant than in the reduced form but e¤ects
are qualitatively similar.
Turning to the treatment e¤ects, we also obtain qualitatively similar results. The permanent
treatment e¤ect is negative and estimated to lie between 30 and 40% (i.e. the 95% condence
interval) while the short-run e¤ect is also negative albeit slightly lower (between 5 and 16%).
Furthermore, there is some evidence of decreasing treatment e¤ects with the intensity of use.
When the number of withdrawals reaches the maximum number of foreign withdrawals per month
in the sample, treatment e¤ects become roughly equal to zero. This might mean that a large
intensity of use signal customers who use their account in a slightly di¤erent ways than others.
Table 8 reports the results of counterfactuals by summarizing demand (i.e. the number of
foreign withdrawals) by the number of treated accounts i.e. the number of accounts above the
threshold. We also report summaries of two prot components: the prot earned from imposing
the fee and the costs of interchange due to foreign withdrawals by bank customers and they are
reported as prots per account and per month. First, the proportion of treated remains the same
across experiments in which fees change since only observations for which the intensity of use is
above the threshold are a¤ected by the reform (see equation (2)). Its level at 4% is marginally less
than what is observed in the data for the treatment periods (t = 23=28): In contrast, the number
of treated accounts is strongly increasing when the threshold is decremented by one or two units
and in particular in the latter case, the number of treated accounts reaches 17%. This explains
why expected prots increase more when the threshold is a¤ected than when the fee is increased.
Expected prot when the threshold is decreased by 2 units reaches almost two thirds of the costs
in interchange fees that the bank pays to other banks for their customersforeign withdrawals. As
said, increasing the fee has a more modest ccontribution since the proportion of treated remains
low at 4%. Doubling the fee makes expected prot increase by less than 100 % (87%) and this is
due to the decreasing demand because of the higher fee but for the treated only. It is indeed much
more protable to tax a larger base of customers than to impose higher fees on a small group of
them.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we adopted a two-stage empirical strategy. We rst show with the help of a reduced
form exercise how strong behavioral responses on foreign withdrawals are elicited in the natural
experiment dened by the introduction of foreign fees. We also report that substitution e¤ects
across means of payment in terms of numbers or amounts are small except intriguingly for card
payments. Second, we estimate a structural model that allows us to reconstruct the e¤ect of
hypothetical scenarii in which we change the level of fees or of thresholds used in the pricing
schedule. It shows that decreasing thresholds of payments increases expected prots much more
than increasing fees since the tax base is much larger.
This paper does not adress normative issues and in particular the issue of ine¢ ciency of cash
with respect to card payments. We would need to evaluate parameters which, to our knowledge, do
not seem to be available in the current literature. It is also limited in the sense that it focusses on
the short run impacts of increasing fees and neglects what could be the long run e¤ects of installing
new ATMs as in Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2011) or Donze and Dubec (2011). Nonetheless, in
this period, the ATM market was already quite mature and the number of ATMs was if anything
decreasing in this market.
On the methodological side, other improvements might be in order for future work. Models
that we develop use standard linear techniques while the number of withdrawals is a discrete
variable. Expected prots given the piece-wise linear price schedule is also driven by behavior
at the extremes of the distribution and linear models might need to be adapted to capture these
e¤ects. It would be interesting in particular to develop econometric tools that dispense with
parametric assumptions altogether, as in Pakes, Ho, Ishii and Porter (2011) in which it is shown
that a similar set up leads to partial identication of the parameters of interest.
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A Structural estimation
A.1 Estimating equation
Dene:
mit = n0    t   ig(t; )
and write:
E((it   n0)1fit > n0git j it) = d0tE((it   n0)1fit > n0g j it)
+ d1E((it   n0)21fit > n0g j it):
Dene:
h0(mit; t) = E((it   n0)1fit  n0g j mit) = E(( mit + "it)1f"it  mitg j mit);
=  mit( mit=t) +
Z
"itmit
1p
2t
"it exp( "2it=22t )d"it;
=  mit( mit=t)  tp
2

exp( "2it=22t )

"itmit ;
=  mit( mit=t) + tp
2
exp( m2it=22t ):
We can also write:
h1(m1t; t) = E((it   n0)21fit > n0g j it) = E(( mit + "it)21f"it  mitg j mit);
= m2it( mit=t)  2mit
tp
2
exp( m2it=22t ) + A:
in which by integration by parts
A =
Z
"itmit
1p
2t
"2it exp( "2it=22t )d"it
=  

tp
2
"it exp( "2it=22t )

"itmit
+
Z
"itmit
tp
2
exp( "2it=22t )d"it;
= mit
tp
2
exp( m2it=22t ) + 2t( mit=t):
Summarizing:
E((it   n0)21fit > n0g j it) = (m2it + 2t )( mit=t) mit
tp
2
exp( m2it=22t ):
The nal equation is thus:
E(yit j mit) = mit   1ft  Tgh(mit; t);
in which :
h(mit; t) = d0th0(mit; t) + d1h1(mit; t):
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A.2 Iterative Algorithm
A possible strategy is to follow these steps:
1. Initialization: Using t < TD the date of the treatment, estimate i; and t: Specically:
(a) Take deviations with respect to time means of yit and deviations of zt and set
^
(0)
t = y:t =
1
n
nX
i=1
yit:
(b) Average over 1 to TD   1; to get:
^
(0)
i = yi: =
1
n
TX
t=1
yit:
(c) In g(t; ) = 1 + zt; set ^
(0)
= 0 and:
(^
(0)
t )
2 =
1
n
X
i
(yit   ^(0)i   ^ (0)t )2:
2. From step k estimates, ^(k)i ; ^
(k)
; ^
(k)
t ; ^
(k)
t and using the full sample, estimate step k +
1 parameters ^(k+1)i ; ^
(k+1)
; ^
(k+1)
t ; ^
(k+1)
t ; d^
(k+1)
0 and d^
(k+1)
1 in the following way.
(a) Compute the estimated m^(k)it = n0   ^ (k)t   ^(k)i g(t; ^
(k)
) and estimates of functions
h0(m^
(k)
it ; ^
(k)
t ) and h1(m^
(k)
it ; ^
(k)
t ):
(b) Regress yit   ^(k)i g(t; ^
(k)
)   ^ (k)t on h0 and h1 interacted with treatment dummies to
get d^(k+1)0 and d^
(k+1)
1 :
(c) Predict the residual of this regression and add to it (^(k)i g(t; ^
(k)
) + ^
(k)
t ). Set ^
(k+1)
t to
the time means of this variable and denote y^it the deviation of this variable wrt to the
time means.
(d) Average y^it over 1 to T; to get:
^
(k+1)
i = y^i::
(e) Construct the interactions zt^
(k+1)
i and estimate the equation:
y^it = ^
(k+1)
i + zt^
(k+1)
i  + ~"it
and retrieve estimates ^
(k+1)
:
(f) Predict the residuals of this regression and from them compute an estimate ^(k+1)t .
3. Repeat the previous step until convergence in terms of parameters.
If this converges, this is the nal estimate. We can then do a Newton-Raphson step to get an
e¢ cient estimate.
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A.3 Simulating residuals
Given estimates of the model, we simulate residuals conditional on residuals observed in the data.
For the periods before treatment this is easy since:
yit = it =  t + i(1 + zt) + tuit:
Therefore we use estimates of  t; t, i and  to derive residuals u^it for t = 1 to 20: For the periods
after treatment, we use a di¤erent strategy. Using equation (2) we have that:
yit = it   (it   n0)1fit > n0g(d0t + d1(it   n0)): (6)
and thus
E(yit j  t; i(1+zt); t) =  t+i(1+zt) d0th0(n0  t i(1+zt); t) d1h1(n0  t i(1+zt); t):
Denote:
v^it = yit   E^(yit j  t; i(1 + zt); t) (7)
in which E^ is obtained by replacing parameters by their estimates. By using equations (6) and
(7), we get an evaluation of residuals u^it which are given by:
v^it = ^tu^it + (^tu^it   m^it)1f^tu^it > m^itg(d^0t + d^1(^tu^it   m^it));
if we set
m^it = ^ t + ^i(1 + zt^):
This yields under some conditions that are veried in our data:8<: u^it =
v^it
^t
if v^it  m^it;
u^it =
 (1+d^0t)+
p
(1+d^0t)2 4d^1(m^it v^it)
2d^1^t
if v^it > m^it;
for all t = 21 to 28. We thus have a sequence of residuals fu^itgt=1;:;28 that we use for simulation
purposes by drawing into this distribution. To obtain standard errors, we bootstrap the whole
process by clustering at the account level.
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TABLES
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Nb Foreign ATM Withdrawals 1.57 2.43 0 49
Nb Own bank ATM Wdwls 1.84 3.01 0 89
Nb ATM Withdrawals 3.43 4.10 0 94
Nb Card Payments 11.43 11.06 0 509
Nb Desk Withdrawals .252 .797 0 31
Nb Cheques 2.33 4.06 0 145
Amount Foreign ATM Wdwls 83.21 140.98 0 4500
Amount Own bank ATM Wdwls 155.29 283.14 0 11200
Amount ATM Withdrawals 238.50 322.20 0 12000
Amount Card Payments 433.37 500.66 0 21606.33
Amount Desk Withdrawals 89.96 600.47 0 310000
Amount Cheques 430.84 2652.65 0 619041
Source: 60000 accounts. Notes: Amounts are in current euros.
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Table 2: Frequency of Foreign ATM withdrawals per period
Foreign w. T = 1-13 T = 14-17 T = 18-20 T = 21-22 T = 23-28 Total
0 44.84 46.32 45.73 48.02 50.91 46.67
1 to n0-2 39.55 38.93 38.42 37.60 36.55 38.56
n0-1 to n0 8.39 7.91 8.50 7.75 7.19 8.03
n0+1 to n0+4 5.43 5.12 5.49 4.98 4.12 5.08
Over n0+4 1.79 1.72 1.87 1.66 1.23 1.66
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: 60000 accounts
Notes: T = 1-13 denotes the pre-treatment period, T = 14-17 and T = 18-20 the two interim periods
and T = 21-22 and T = 23-28 the two treatment periods
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Table 3: Treatment effects using month controls
OLS FGLS OLS OLS
Intensity of use Mean T=1/9 Mean T=1/9 Median T=1/9 Q3 T=1/9
T = 14/17 -0.061∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
T = 18/20 -0.083∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
T = 21/22 -0.175∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
T = 23/28 -0.248∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Begin Mon/Thu 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
End Mon/Thu -0.037∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Nb BusinessDays 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.340 0.316 0.318
Number of obs. 1140000 1140000 1140000 1140000
Source: 60000 accounts, Periods = 10-28.
Notes: Treatments are defined as periods, T = 14-17 and T = 18-20 are the two interim periods
and T = 21-22 and T = 23-28 the two treatment periods
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Treatment effects: Two samples
Working sample Sample 2
Intensity of use Mean T=1/12 Mean T=1/12
T = 14/17 -0.041∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
T = 18/20 -0.094∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
T = 21/22 -0.171∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
T = 23/28 -0.251∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Begin Mon/Thu 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
End Mon/Thu -0.023∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Nb BusinessDays 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
N 960000 960000
Source: Two working samples, T=13/28
Notes: Treatments are defined as periods, T = 14-17 and T = 18-20 are the two interim periods
and T = 21-22 and T = 23-28 the two treatment periods
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Structural model
Structural model Model 1 Model 2
Treatment t= 21-22 -0.102 -0.105
[-0.167, -0.0431] [-0.168, -0.0422]
Treatment t= 23-28 -0.352 -0.358
[-0.431, -0.292] [-0.419, -0.302]
Intensity 0.00924 0.00982
[0.00275, 0.022] [0.0036, 0.0202]
Begin Mon/Thu 0.0189 0.0189
[0.0131, 0.0245] [0.0132, 0.0248]
End Mon/Thu -0.0166 -0.0167
[-0.0238, -0.0102] [-0.0239, -0.0103]
Nb BusinessDays 0.0207 0.0203
[0.0182, 0.0228] [0.0181, 0.0225]
Time -0.000431
[-0.00172, 0.000863]
Period t=14-28 0.00794
[-0.0141, 0.0257]
Source: Sample of 60000 accounts, Periods = 1-28.
Parameters are defined as in equations (4) and (5): The first three coefficients
are d0t, d1 in (4) and the following coefficients refer to the z variables in (5).
Standard errors are computed by bootstrap (399 replications) and confidence
intervals are constructed using 2.5 and 97.5 percent bootstrap quantiles.
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